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Searching for Optimal 
Inequality/ Incentives
Anders Björklund and Richard B. Freeman
Economic inequality is Janus-  faced. Inequality creates incentives for 
people to move from lower-  rewarding activities to higher-  rewarding activi-
ties, which raises output and should reduce the diﬀerence in rewards. 
Inequality also produces diﬀerences in living standards that can lead some 
into poverty and social exclusion. In public debate, persons on the right 
stress the eﬀect of inequality on incentives and work eﬀort, while persons 
on the left stress the eﬀect of inequality on living standards for those with 
low incomes. Both are important.
Since the 1960s, Sweden has been a world leader in reducing inequality 
and poverty. In the labor market, institutional wage determination com-
pressed hourly earnings for persons with similar measured skills and limited 
diﬀerentials across skill groups (Björklund and Freeman 1997), while disper-
sion of literacy and numeracy skills in Sweden was also low compared to the 
United States (Devroye and Freeman 2002). Family background played a 
smaller role in labor market success than in the United States (Solon 2002; 
Björklund and Jäntti 1997; Björklund et al. 2002). Inequality was lower 
in Sweden than in the United States in long-  run/  permanent earnings and 
income, as well as in the transitory component (Aaberge et al. 2002).1 Gener-
ous welfare beneﬁ  ts and high tax rates extended egalitarianism beyond the 
working population so that the disposable income in the bottom decile of 
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1. Sweden was not the only country with a highly egalitarian distribution of income. Other 
Scandinavian countries and Belgium also had low inequality in labor market earnings and in 
total income, and Japan has low inequality in total income.26        Anders Björklund and Richard B. Freeman
the income distribution was closer to the median than in most other coun-
tries.2 As a result, a poor child in Sweden had a higher income than a poor 
child in the United States, despite the United States having higher per capita 
gross domestic product (GDP). These facts led Social Democrats in Sweden 
and elsewhere to see the country as establishing an attractive welfare state 
alternative to more market-  driven capitalist economies.
The huge recession that hit Sweden from 1991 to 1994 challenged the 
viability of the Swedish model. Rates of unemployment rose from below 2 
percent to over 9 percent,3 and the proportion of the workforce on labor mar-
ket programs reached 5.5 percent in 1994. The employment-  to-  population 
rate fell from 83.1 in 1990 to 70.7 in 1997,4 in large part because Sweden 
reduced public-  sector employment to deal with a crisis in public ﬁ  nances. 
The rise in unemployment, job loss, and ﬁ  scal problems were a wake- up call 
that the economy was not as healthy as touted. Many analysts believed that 
Sweden had strayed too far from market solutions for the long- term success 
of the welfare state and called for market reforms that invariably increased 
inequalities.
From the mid- 1990s through the mid- 2000s, the Swedish economy recov-
ered smartly from recession. Real GDP per capita in purchasing power parity 
terms increased rapidly from 1993/ 1994 to 2006, though Sweden still ranked 
lower in GDP per capita among those countries than it had in the 1980s. 
Productivity increased more in Sweden than in most other advanced Organ-
ization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, 
including the United States, and was accompanied by growth in real wages 
(Fredriksson and Topel, chapter 3 in this volume). The current account in 
the balance of trade became positive. The country moved to the top rung in 
what the OECD has termed investment in knowledge—research and devel-
opment spending, investment in higher education, and investment in infor-
mation technology. The World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness 
Report (2008) placed Sweden fourth out of 131 countries in competitiveness 
in 2007/  2008.
But job growth lagged the recovery overall.5 Between 1994 and 2000, 
private-  sector employment expanded by 300,000, while public-  sector 
2. In 1991, the disposable income of adults aged twenty to sixty- four in the bottom decile of 
the income distribution was 60 percent of the median. Among children aged zero to seventeen, 
the ratio of disposable income of those in the bottom decile was 67 percent of median income. 
Among adults, the ratio of disposable income in the top decile to income in the bottom decile 
was 2.67, while among children, the ratio of income in the top decile to income in the bottom 
decile was 2.23 (Björklund and Freeman 1997).
3. Unemployment rates vary, depending on whether they have been adjusted for international 
comparability. The National Institute of Economic Research (Sweden) gives quarterly open 
unemployment rates that reach 9.4 percent in the fourth quarter of 1993 and in the ﬁ  rst quarter 
of 1997. The OECD gives standardized unemployment rates of 1.7 percent in 1990 that rise to 
9.6 percent in 1996 and 9.9 percent in 1997.
4.  Available  at:  http:/ / ocde.p4.siteinternet.com/ publications/ doiﬁ  les/  302005041P1T050.xls.
5. OECD (2005); this occurred as well in the United States, Korea, and other countries.Searching for Optimal Inequality/Incentives    2 7
employment stagnated. After exceeding the rate of unemployment in the 
European Union at the peak of the recession, Sweden’s unemployment rate 
fell to 4 percent in 2001 and 2002. The proportion of the workforce on labor 
market programs (which is not counted as part of unemployment) also fell, 
bottoming out at 2.1 percent in 2003, but even so, the jobless rate, includ-
ing labor market programs, remained high. As of 2005, the employment-
  population rate in the country was several points below the prerecession 
1991 level.6
What happened to Sweden’s egalitarian outcomes during the crisis and 
recovery? Did the crisis lead Swedes to view inequality and life and job 
satisfaction diﬀerently than in the past? Did the incentives from increased 
inequality contribute to the recovery and competitiveness? Why has Sweden 
done so well in investing in knowledge and competitiveness, despite lower 
inequality and pecuniary incentives than most other advanced economies?
This chapter examines these questions. Section 1.1 shows that inequal-
ity in earnings and income increased moderately through the early 2000s, 
while inequality in hours worked increased substantially, making it the most 
important form of inequality in the society. But the rise in inequality not-
withstanding, Sweden remained a leading egalitarian economy in the world. 
Section 1.2 shows that Swedes are aware of the inequity and incentive sides 
of inequality and that their tolerance for inequality, while less than that 
of Americans, is similar to that of persons in most other advanced econo-
mies. It also shows that satisfaction with living conditions has been relatively 
stable, while satisfaction with wages has become modestly lower. Section 1.3 
argues that the increased earnings inequality was productivity enhancing 
but that factors other than pecuniary rewards in the labor market underlie 
Sweden’s large investment in university training and success in knowledge-
 intensive  activity.
1.1      Earnings, Hours Worked, and Income Inequality
To determine how the distribution of earnings changed in the 1990s to 
the early 2000s period of recession and recovery, we examined employer 
reports on earnings from Statistics Sweden and individual reports on earn-
ings from the Level of Living (LNU) Survey. Figure 1.1 displays the ratios 
of the earnings of employees in the 90th percentile of the before- tax monthly 
earnings distribution to the earnings of employees in the 10th percentile 
(90/  10 ratio) and the comparable ratios of earnings for persons at the 90th 
percentile relative to median earnings (90/ 10) and of earnings at the median 
to earnings at the 10th percentile (50/  10). All of the earnings are adjusted 
6. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Oﬃce of Productivity and Tech-
nology; see table 5 of Comparative Real Gross Domestic Product per Capita and per Employed 
Person, Fifteen Countries, 1960–  2005, June 16, 2006; available at: http:/  /  www.bls.gov/  ﬂ  s.28        Anders Björklund and Richard B. Freeman
to a full-  time equivalent basis from employer records for 1990 to 2006. The 
data show that the 90/  10 ratio went from 1.8 in 1995 to 2.0 in 2003, with the 
rise roughly divided equally between an increase in the 90/  50 ratio and an 
increase in the 50/  10 ratio. These increases in inequality are substantive in 
low-  inequality Sweden. The ﬁ  gure also gives percentile income ratios from 
the 1991 and 2000 LNU. The LNU data shows a smaller rise in inequality. 
The LNU had a higher level of inequality than the employer-  based data in 
1991 and a similar rate in 2000.
Björklund and Freeman (1997) found that Sweden’s relatively egalitarian 
distribution of annual earnings was due as much to a narrow distribution 
of hours worked as to the more publicized narrow distribution of hourly 
earnings. To see how hours worked changed over the 1990s, we tabulated 
the distribution of working hours from the 1991 and 2000 LNU surveys, 
which give annual hours for 1990 and 1999, respectively. The hours mea-
sure includes hours paid for but spent on vacation time and hours employed 
when the worker is on short-  term absences due to sickness or to caring for 
a sick child.
Table 1.1 gives the mean hours worked, the coeﬃcient of variation in 
hours worked, and the distribution of hours worked for individuals aged 
nineteen to sixty- four. It shows a substantial increase in inequality of hours 
worked, with the coeﬃcient of variation in hours worked rising from 0.52 to 
0.63. The increase is almost entirely due to an increase in the proportion of 
Fig. 1.1    Hourly earnings inequality: 1992 to 2006 (according to Statistics Sweden) 
and 1991 and 2000 (according to the Level of Living Survey)
Source: Statistics Sweden (SCB) and own computations from the Level of Living Survey 
(LNU). The former is based on full- time equivalent monthly earnings reports from employers. 
The latter is based on home interviews with individuals. Each of the data sources has advan-
tages and disadvantages.Searching for Optimal Inequality/Incentives    2 9
persons working zero hours and thus who are long-  term unemployed. Dis-
aggregating hours for the age groups nineteen to twenty- four, twenty- ﬁ  ve to 
ﬁ  fty- four, and ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty- four shows that the largest increase is among 
nineteen-   to  twenty- four- year- olds,  which  reﬂ  ects both the unemployment 
of those out of school and the increased proportion of young persons in 
school without any accompanying time worked. The growth of inequality in 
hours is smallest for older people, possibly due to the incentives the reformed 
pension system gives to persons to keep working through age sixty-  seven.7 
The social problem with high inequality in hours worked is not that high-
  wage workers put in many hours (which arguably exaggerates inequality in 
well- being due to the notion that leisure is a normal good) but that low- wage 
workers work fewer hours and/  or are unemployed.
Rising inequality in monthly earnings and hours worked increased the 
dispersion of annual disposable income among families during the reces-
sion and into the ensuing recovery. Panel A of ﬁ  gure 1.2 displays the Gini 
coeﬃcient measure of inequality measured by Statistic Sweden’s pre-  1991 
tax reform income deﬁ  nition (labeled old) and by its post-  1991 tax reform 
deﬁ  nition (labeled new). The Gini from both deﬁ  nitions in the overlap 
period shows that the more inclusive deﬁ  nition increased inequality so that 
an accurate reading of trends requires that we compute them separately. 
The Gini under the new deﬁ  nition increased from 0.23 to a peak of 0.31 in 
2000 and then fell to 0.28/  0.29 through 2005. Panel B of the ﬁ  gure, which 
measures inequality by income ratios for diﬀerent deciles, tells a similar 
story. The income at the 90th percentile relative to that at the 10th percentile 
Table 1.1  The distribution of working hours: 1990 and 1999
Individuals
All, 
19–65 years 19–24 years 25–54 years 55–65 years
    1990   1999   1990   1999   1990   1999   1990   1999
Mean 1,650 1,510 1,170 770 1,825 1,690 1,340 1,350
Coeﬃcient of variation .51 .63 .72 1.07 .41 .51 .69 .74
Proportions
 0  hours .099 .179 .114 .309 .059 .122 .249 .287
 1–1,000  hours .100 .102 .329 .336 .070 .074 .058 .049
 1,001–1,500  hours .113 .080 .151 .121 .092 .069 .164 .089
 1,501–2,000  hours .155 .158 .110 .087 .172 .179 .119 .130
 2,001–2,500  hours .449 .407 .273 .129 .508 .468 .355 .377
 2,501 hours .080 .075 .021 .016 .098 .088 .055 .066
N   4,423   4,458  622   559   3,054  3,005  747   894
Source: Own computations from the Level of Living (LNU) surveys.
7. We obtained similar results with hours worked per adult household member.30        Anders Björklund and Richard B. Freeman
went from 2.55 in 1991 to 3.20 in 2005. The lines for the ratio of income for 
the 90th percentile to the median and for the median to the 10th percen-
tile show, as with ratios of earnings in ﬁ  gure 1.1, that the rise in the 90/  10 
ratio is roughly divided equally between rises in the 90/  50 ratio and the 
50/ 10  ratio.
The rise in inequality, however, was not associated with losses of income 
for lower-  income families. Panel C of ﬁ  gure 1.2 shows the real disposable 
income of persons in diﬀerent percentiles in the 1980s and in the period of 
rising inequality. The real disposable household incomes at the 10th percen-
tile fell from 1989 to 1997 but then recovered to be about 10 percent higher 
than in 1991. The increased inequality took the form of greater growth of 
incomes for higher- income families, shown by the sharp upward trend in the 
Fig. 1.2    Diverse measures of inequality of annual disposable income, 1980 to 2005: 
A, Gini coeﬃcients; B, Ratios of disposable income by deciles: P90/  P10, P90/  P50, 
and P50/  P10 ratios; C, Real disposable income at the median (P50), 10th (P10), and 
90th (P90) percentile of the distribution: 1980 to 2005 in 2006 prices
Note: Old is based on the more narrow income concept used before the 1991 tax reform. The 
individual is the unit of analysis, and the household is the unit of income. Income includes 
capital gains, which were particularly high in 1994 and 2000 due to changes in tax rules. Sta-
tistics Sweden’s equivalence scales are applied.
Source: Statistics Sweden and special tabulations by Kjell Jansson for the authors.
A
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earning of persons in the 90th percentile from 1995 through 2005—a gain 
of about 37 percent—rather than in declines of incomes for lower-  income 
families.
To what extent did Sweden’s welfare state maintain incomes of house-
holds at the bottom of the distribution during the recession? Table 1.2 uses 
data specially tabulated for our study by Statistics Sweden on the percent-
age of household disposable income that is accruing to persons in diﬀerent 
deciles from earnings, capital returns, pensions, and various government 
programs. If welfare state programs provided a stable safety net, we would 
expect that the share of incomes from programs such as sickness and paren-
tal leave, unemployment insurance (UI), and labor market programs, as well 
as universal tax-  free beneﬁ  ts and means-  tested tax-  free beneﬁ  ts, would rise 
sharply between 1991 and 1995 and would fall thereafter for persons in the 
low-  income deciles but not for those in higher-  income deciles. The table 
shows such a pattern. In 1991, the sum of the share of income in the three 
program areas in the bottom part of the table is 30.1 percent for the bottom 
decile, 26.7 percent for the next- lowest decile, and 24.2 percent for the third-
  lowest decile. In 1995, the sum of the shares of income for these groups are 
49.8 percent, 41.5 percent, and 32.2 percent, respectively—increases of 23.1 
points, 25.8 points, and 6.9 points. By contrast, the share of income from 
these programs barely changes for persons from the fourth decile to the top 
decile. In the recovery, although the shares of income from these programs 
falls for the lower-  income deciles, they remain higher than in the past for 
persons in the bottom and second-  bottom deciles.
The data in table 1.2 also show jumpiness in capital incomes at the bot-
tom of the distribution and in the share of pension incomes. The fall in the 
share of capital incomes indicates that many persons were in the lowest 
C
Fig.  1.2  (cont.)32        Anders Björklund and Richard B. Freeman
decile because of capital losses, while the changing share of pension incomes 
implies that pensions kept older persons from falling in the distribution in 
the recession.
1.1.1      Long-  Run Inequality versus Transitory Inequality
So far, we have looked at cross-  sectional inequality in incomes. Such 
measures can be misleading indicators of changes in permanent incomes, 
because they are aﬀected by transitory factors.8 To see whether the picture 
of Swedish inequality before, during, and after the crisis, shown in ﬁ  gures 
Table 1.2  Percentage of household disposable income net of taxes by diﬀerent source, by decile 
groups: 1991, 1995, 2001, and 2005
Decile 
group
Earnings for employees and 
self- employed Capital Pensions
  1991   1995   2001   2005   1991   1995   2001   2005   1991   1995   2001   2005
1 21.3 33.8 33.7 27.1 5.0 –9.0 –19.2 –1.7 43.6 25.4 40.4 29.6
2 18.0 24.1 21.8 24.2 4.6 2.4 1.1 1.5 50.6 32.2 43.2 43.3
3 32.4 30.5 26.8 26.7 4.4 2.0 0.9 1.5 39.0 35.3 44.2 47.1
4 43.8 38.0 39.8 38.8 4.6 2.7 2.1 1.5 31.1 32.5 37.0 40.4
5 53.6 50.0 56.1 53.6 5.5 3.3 2.4 1.9 23.7 27.8 25.5 29.8
6 62.4 57.7 63.1 64.0 5.3 4.0 2.6 2.4 18.9 23.8 21.8 22.8
7 65.6 61.3 70.0 69.5 5.9 4.1 2.6 2.5 16.8 23.3 16.9 19.8
8 70.7 67.1 73.4 75.1 5.8 4.5 3.5 3.0 14.4 20.0 14.7 15.8
9 72.2 69.3 78.7 77.3 7.1 5.4 3.7 4.0 13.3 18.7 12.0 14.2
10 65.5 67.2 63.8 57.6 19.7 14.8 22.8 29.2 10.1 15.1 10.4 11.4
All 57.7   56.1   60.2   58.1   8.5   5.5   6.7   8.8   20.7   22.9   20.5   22.1
Sickness, parental leave, UI, 
and labor market program 
beneﬁ  ts Universal tax-  free beneﬁ  ts
Means- tested  tax- free 
beneﬁ  ts
1991   1995   2001   2005   1991   1995   2001   2005   1991   1995   2001   2005
1 9.1 16.7 11.8 11.7 9.8 16.0 18.2 19.8 11.2 17.1 15.2 13.5
2 7.5 16.2 10.0 9.4 6.4 10.3 10.8 10.2 12.8 15.0 13.1 11.4
3 9.2 13.4 9.9 8.2 7.1 6.9 7.7 5.9 7.9 11.9 10.4 10.6
4 10.5 12.6 10.6 11.2 6.3 6.1 6.4 5.5 3.6 8.2 4.1 2.7
5 10.6 10.7 10.0 8.8 4.9 4.7 4.8 4.7 1.6 3.5 1.1 1.1
6 8.5 8.8 8.2 6.7 3.9 4.0 3.6 3.7 1.0 1.8 0.7 0.4
7  7.9 7.4 7.3 5.2 3.1  2.7 3.0 2.5 0.6 1.3 0.2 0.5
8 7.0 5.8 6.1 4.2 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.8 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.2
9 5.8 5.1 4.1 3.4 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0
10 3.8 2.2 2.4 1.3 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.2 0
All   7.2  7.8  6.4  5.3  3.4   3.9  3.7  3.5  2.5  3.8  2.5  2.3
Source: Statistics Sweden and special tabulations done by Kjell Jansson for the authors.
Note: Relevant taxes are subtracted for taxable income sources.
8. A common hypothesis is that compared to European social welfare states, the United 
States has greater income mobility over the career so that comparisons of income inequality 
based on cross-  sectional incomes exaggerate U.S.-  European diﬀerences. Research through the 
early 1990s has shown that the United States is not much diﬀerent than Germany (Burkhauser 
and Poupore 1997) or than the Nordic countries (Aaberge et al. 2002) in this respect.Searching for Optimal Inequality/Incentives    3 3
1.1 and 1.2, changes markedly if we take account of income mobility, we 
use Swedish register data that follow individuals’ earnings over time. We 
look at inequality based on annual earnings and ﬁ  ve-  year averages for four 
cohorts of Swedish men from 1981 to 2005, based on a 35 percent sample of 
the whole Swedish- born population of men, including the zero observations 
for those who did not have any earnings from work.9
Figure 1.3 reports results from this analysis for cohorts of men born in 
1950, 1955, 1960, and 1965. For each cohort, we report measures of earn-
ings inequality from age thirty-  one onward. We start at age thirty-  one to 
avoid the large increase and volatility in earnings that usually take place 
during the process of labor market entrance. The ﬁ  gure shows ﬁ  rst that the 
older cohorts had lower inequality at each age level than did the younger 
cohorts. For example, the 1950 cohort aged thirty- one to thirty- ﬁ  ve years in 
1981 to 1985 had a coeﬃcient of variation around 0.40 to 0.45, compared 
to a coeﬃcient of variation around 0.6 for the 1965 cohort at the same age. 
The same pattern of greater inequality at the same age is found for succes-
sively younger cohorts. Second, the ﬁ  gure shows rising earnings inequal-
ity by age for a speciﬁ  c cohort. This pattern—which presumably reﬂ  ects 
diﬀerential investments in on-  the-  job training—is so strong that it is hard 
to discern a clear rise in inequality during the crisis period from 1991 to 
1995. Third, the measures of inequality that cover ﬁ  ve-  year earnings show 
suﬃciently large increases in inequality to rule out increased short- run earn-
ings volatility as an important factor behind rising inequality in the Swedish 
labor market.
Finally, ﬁ  gure 1.4 gives a measure of earnings mobility, based on annual 
and long- run inequality—the so- called Shorrocks measure.10 It shows some 
diﬀerences between the cohorts, but the magnitude of mobility is too low to 
challenge the conclusion of rising longer-  run measures of inequality given 
in the cross-  sections of annual inequality in ﬁ  gures 1.1 and 1.2. Thus, our 
analysis supports Gustavsson’s (2007) ﬁ  nding that the increased inequality 
is largely due to changes in the long- run component of earnings rather than 
in transitory earnings.
1.1.2    International  Perspective
Income inequality rose in many countries during the 1990s through the 
mid-  2000s. How did Sweden’s rise of inequality compare to the changes in 
other advanced countries?
Table 1.3 gives our best estimate of the change in inequality among coun-
tries and of Sweden’s rank in terms of the magnitude of the change. Panel 
A records the ratios of earnings at the 90th percentile to earnings at the 
9. The income concept is called “arbetsinkomst” and includes income from short-  term sick-
ness and parental leave but not UI beneﬁ  ts or labor market training stipends.
10. The measure is deﬁ  ned as one minus the ratio of long- run inequality and weighted annual 
inequality and takes on values between zero and one for a standard class of inequality mea-
sures. See Shorrocks (1978).Fig.  1.3  Coeﬃcient of variation of annual earnings and of ﬁ  ve-  year average earn-
ings, 1981 to 2005, four cohorts of men: A, Men born 1950; B, Men born 1955; C, 
Men born 1960; D, Men born 1965
Source: Swedish register data.Searching for Optimal Inequality/Incentives    3 5
10th percentile in 1990, or in two cases, an earlier period, and in 2003, or the 
latest period for which data was available from the OECD earnings database 
of full- time dependent employees, and it gives the percentage- point changes 
in earnings ratios. It ranks the countries by increasing inequality, and Swe-
den ﬁ  ts in the middle of the distribution: it had the sixth-  largest increase in 
earnings ratios among the thirteen countries. Panel B records comparable 
earnings ratios and Gini coeﬃcients from the Luxembourg Income Study 
(LIS), with the countries listed in order of increasing inequality in the earn-
ings ratio in that data set. There are some striking inconsistencies between 
the OECD and LIS rankings: the OECD, for example, shows Finland with 
declining inequality, while the LIS shows it with rising inequality, and while 
the OECD has Danish inequality falling, the LIS shows it rising. Some of 
this diﬀerence may be due to diﬀerences in years covered, in treatment of 
part-  time workers, and so on. For the purposes of this study, however, the 
LIS data place Sweden in a similar position as the OECD data. In terms 
of increases in the 90/  10 earnings ratio, Sweden is tied for eighth out of 
nineteenth countries. In terms of increases in the Gini coeﬃcients, Sweden 
is tied for third with the United States and Spain. Thus, Sweden’s increase 
in inequality put it reasonably high in the ranking of countries by the mag-
nitude of increased inequality.11
Even so, however, inequality was suﬃciently low in Sweden so that the 
country remained one of the lowest inequality countries in the world. In 
table 1.3, Sweden has the lowest 90/  10 ratio of earnings in the OECD data 
Fig. 1.4    Earnings mobility for cohorts of men born in 1950, 1955, 1960, and 1965
Source: Swedish register data.
11. Our data tell a diﬀerent story than that of Smeeding (2002), who puts Sweden in the lower 
third or so of countries by increased inequality in the 1990s.Table 1.3  Level and changes in 90/10 ratios of earnings from 1990s to early 2000s in OECD 
and level and changes in 90/10 ratios of earnings and Gini coeﬃcients in 
Luxembourg Income Study: late 1980s/early 1990s through 2000
A. OECD earnings database of full-  time employees
 
Countries in order of increasing 
inequality in OECD  
90/10 ratio 
early year  
90/10 ratio 
last year   Change 
New Zealand, 1990–2003 2.34a 2.90 0.56a
Switzerland, 1990–2003 2.71 3.22 0.51
United States, 1990–2003 4.34 4.67 0.33
Denmark, 1990–2003 2.16 2.63 0.47
The Netherlands, 1985/1989–1955/1999 2.55 2.85 0.30
Sweden, 1990–2003 2.01 2.30 0.29
Germany, 1990–2002 2.76 3.04 0.28
Australia, 1990–2003 2.81 3.07 0.26
Italy, 1985/1989–1955/1999 2.29 2.40 0.11
United Kingdom, 1990–2003 3.41 3.50 0.09
Finland, 1990–2002 2.49 2.45 –0.04
France, 1990–2002 3.26 3.13 –0.13
  Japan, 1990–2003   3.16   2.94   –0.22  
B. Luxembourg Income Study data: 1987 to 2000
Countries and years covered in 
order of increasing inequality 
in LIS earnings ratio  









Spain, 1990–2000 3.96 4.69 0.73 .303 .336 .033
Belgium, 1988–2000 2.77 3.30 0.53 .232 .279 .047
Finland, 1987–2004 2.59 3.04 0.45 .209 .252 .043
Germany, 1989–2000 2.99 3.37 0.38 .257 .275 .018
Canada, 1987–2000 3.89 4.19 0.30 .283 .311 .028
Austria, 1987–2000 2.85 3.15 0.30 .227 .257 .030
Luxembourg, 1991–2000 2.97 3.25 0.28 .239 .260 .021
Sweden, 1987–2000 2.71 2.96 0.25 .218 .252 .034
Ireland, 1987–2000 4.23 4.48 0.25 .328 .313 –.015
Australia, 1989–2003 4.19 4.24 0.05 .304 .312 .008
Norway, 1991–2000 2.76 2.80 0.04 .223 .251 .028
United States, 1991–2004 5.65 5.68 0.03 .338 .372 .034
France, 1989–2000 3.46 3.45 –0.01 .287 .278 –.009
Italy, 1987–2000 4.49 4.47 –0.02 .332 .333 .001
United Kingdom, 1991–1999 4.67 4.57 –0.10 .336 .343 .007
The Netherlands, 1987–1999 2.94 2.78 –0.16 .256 .231 –.025
Switzerland, 1991–2002 3.62 3.37 –0.25 .307 .274 –.023
Denmark, 1987–2004   3.23  2.78  –0.45   .254  .228  –.026
Source: Panel A is tabulated from the OECD Society at a Glance (2006). Trends in earnings dispersions 
of full- time workers in the twenty OECD members and the changes from 1985/1989 to 1995/1999 for the 
Netherlands and Italy are from table 3.2 in the OECD Employment Outlook (2004). Panel B is tabulated 
from the Luxembourg Income Study, available at: http://www.lisproject.org/key-  ﬁ  gures/key-  ﬁ  gures
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in 2003 and has the third-  lowest 90/  10 ratio of earnings in the LIS data 
set. It is tied for ﬁ  fth with Finland in its Gini coeﬃcient in the 2000 LIS 
data. Table 1.4 records additional measures of inequality circa 2000 from 
other sources: OECD earnings data published in the Employment Outlook 
(2004); ratios of 90/  10 levels of disposable income from the LIS, earnings 
ratios from a study by Martins and Pereira (2004), Gini coeﬃcients from 
the United Nations (UN) Human Development Report (2005), and other 
LIS measures. In all of these statistics, Sweden remains among the lowest 
inequality countries in the advanced world. Sweden ranges from second to 
fourth in having lower-  income inequality. It has the second or third lowest 
90/  10 earnings ratio, behind Norway and Denmark in column (1), behind 
Norway in column (2), and behind Germany in column (3). It has the third-
 lowest Gini in column (4) and the fourth- lowest Gini in column (5). It is third 
in the fraction of persons whose disposable incomes place them below 50 
percent of the median income in columns (6) and (7).
To see the extent to which the narrow wage dispersion aﬀects incentives to 
invest in skill in Sweden relative to other advanced countries, we examined 
OECD data on the relative earnings for workers with tertiary education for 
twenty-  two countries. In 2004, earnings for those with tertiary education 
relative to average earnings was 1.28 in Sweden, compared to 1.72 in the 
United States. This placed Sweden third lowest in relative earnings for uni-
versity graduates among the countries. For “tertiary-  type A and advanced 
research programmes,” the relative income ratio was 1.39 in Sweden, com-
pared to 1.81 in the United States.12 Other OECD data conﬁ  rm this picture. 
Estimating log earnings equations for twenty- one OECD countries for 2001, 
Boarini and Strauss (2007, table 1) report a coeﬃcient for tertiary education 
relative to secondary education for men of 0.26 in Sweden (second lowest 
in the countries covered) and of 0.21 for women (the lowest), compared to 
0.65 for men and 0.64 for women in the United States, which was the highest 
among the countries covered.
In short, despite the rise in inequality during the period of crisis and recov-
ery, Sweden remained one of the lowest inequality countries in the world, 
Table 1.3  (continued)
aNew Zealand data is estimated as follows: OECD ﬁ  gures for all workers cover 1997 to 2003 
and show an increase in the ratio from 2.56 to 2.90—a rise of 0.34 points. Separate data for 
men and women show an increase of 0.38 points in the 90/10 ratio for men from 1990 to 1997 
and show an increase of 0.06 points in the 90/10 ratio for women. The data also show increases 
for men from 1990 to 2000 of 0.97 points and for women of 0.22 points. As a crude approxima-
tion, we take the average change in the ratios from 1990 to 1997 for the two genders and add 
0.22 points to get the 0.56 points. This is of the same magnitude as the average change for the 
two genders from 1990 to 2003 of 0.60 points.
12. See table B-  12.1, “Relative earnings of the population with income from employment,” 
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with an exceptionally low wage gap between university and high school 
graduates. Inequality rose greatly in hours of work and employment, but the 
high social safety net partially oﬀset the eﬀects of this on family incomes.
1.2    Attitudes  Toward  Inequality/  Incentives
How do Swedes view the incentive and inequity components of inequality 
described in our introduction? Are Swedes more or less sensitive to those 
components when compared to Americans and citizens in other countries, 
and if so, why?
Table 1.5 records the responses of persons to questions relating to inequal-
ity13 from the 1999 International Social Science Program (ISSP) Social 
Inequality III survey.14 By way of summary, the agree- disagree lines give the 
diﬀerences between the percentages that agree or that strongly agree with a 
statement and the percentages that disagree or that strongly disagree with it. 
The upper four panels give the responses to statements about the incentive 
component of inequality: whether people get rewarded for eﬀort, whether 
diﬀerences in income are necessary for national prosperity, whether people 
get rewarded for skill, and whether study requires additional pay as an incen-
tive. The data show that proportionately fewer Swedes believe in the incen-
tive eﬀects of inequality than do Americans. For instance, fewer Swedes 
than Americans agree or agree strongly that “people get rewarded for eﬀort” 
and that people get “rewarded for skill,” and more Swedes than Americans 
disagree strongly with the idea that diﬀerences in income are necessary for 
prosperity. But Swedish responses are similar to those for other advanced 
countries. The odd country is the United States, not Sweden.
The next three panels summarize responses to questions about the ineq-
uity component of inequality: whether inequality beneﬁ  ts the rich, whether 
diﬀerences in income are too large, and whether one must be corrupt to 
get to the top. In all of these cases, Swedes show more concern about the 
inequitable aspects of income inequality than do Americans, but again, the 
attitude of Swedes is not peculiar. Indeed, proportionately fewer Swedes 
than persons in the composite of other countries agree that inequality exists 
because it beneﬁ  ts the rich, that the income diﬀerences in their country are 
too large, and that you have to be corrupt to get on top. But Swedes are closer 
to others in their views than they are to those of Americans.
Where Swedes and the citizens of the other countries diﬀer most from 
13. These economies are Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany (West), 
Great Britain, Japan, New Zealand, Northern Ireland, Norway, and Spain.
14. The ISSP is a cross- national collaboration on surveys covering topics important for social 
science research, which has the virtue that it asks the same questions of persons in diﬀerent 
countries, facilitating cross- country analyses. In addition to the United States and Sweden, our 
analysis covers Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany (West), Great Britain, 
Japan, New Zealand, Northern Ireland, Norway, and Spain as a group.Table 1.5  Attitudes of Swedes, Americans, and persons in other advanced countries toward the 
incentive and inequity components of inequality: 1999
People get rewarded for eﬀort
Diﬀerences in income necessary 
for prosperity
    Sweden   United States   Others   Sweden   United States   Others
Strongly agree 3 11 5 3 4 4
Agree 31 50 35 17 20 16
Neither 36 22 25 29 27 22
Disagree 20 9 25 31 31 35
Strongly disagree 5 2 7 15 8 17
Don’t know 6 6 3 5 9 6
Agree- Disagree 9   50   8   –26   –15   –32
People get rewarded for skill Study requires additional pay
Sweden   United States   Others   Sweden   United States   Others
Strongly agree 3 15 6 19 21 27
Agree 35 55 43 50 37 44
Neither 37 16 23 16 13 11
Disagree 15 7 20 11 18 12
Strongly disagree 4 1 5 2 4 4
Don’t know 6 6 3 3 7 3
Agree- Disagree 19   62   24   56   36   55
Inequality beneﬁ  ts rich
Diﬀerences in income 
too large




States   Others   Sweden  
United 
States   Others   Sweden  
United 
States   Others
Strongly agree 16 12 24 29 23 36 4 4 8
Agree 42 32 44 41 38 41 14 12 20
Neither 21 24 14 18 20 12 29 22 20
Disagree 13 16 11 8 9 7 24 35 30
Strongly disagree 3 4 3 2 3 1 16 21 18
Don’t know 8 11 4 1 7 3 13 6 5
Agree- Disagree 42   24   54   60   49   69   –22   –40   –20
Government must reduce diﬀerences Rich should pay more taxes
Sweden   United States   Others   Sweden   United States   Others
Strongly agree 23 10 25 16 20 25
Agree 35 22 35 59 39 50
Neither 22 24 16 22 30 19
Disagree 12 23 14 1 1 1
Strongly disagree 6 14 6 0 1 1
Don’t know 3 7 5 2 8 4
Agree- Disagree   40   –5   40   74   57   73
Source: Tabulated from the 1999 ISSP Social Inequality III survey.Searching for Optimal Inequality/Incentives    4 1
Americans is in their belief that government should intervene to reduce 
income diﬀerences. The two panels at the bottom of table 1.5 show a huge 
diﬀerence between Swedes and Americans in the belief that government 
must reduce income diﬀerences and that rich people should pay more taxes. 
Again, the attitudes of Swedes more closely resemble those of citizens in the 
other advanced countries than those of Americans.15
What might cause the wide diﬀerences in attitudes between Swedes and 
persons in most other advanced economies from those in the United States? 
There is growing evidence that attitudes toward fairness in economic trans-
actions are hard-  wired into human beings, with people favoring egalitarian 
splits of incomes in some circumstances, such as the ultimatum game, but it is 
hard to imagine some genetic basis for diﬀerences in attitudes toward inequal-
ity. One appealing hypothesis is that the attitudes to some extent reﬂ  ect eco-
nomic reality: in the United States, the wide dispersion in earnings and high 
returns to skill should lead more people to believe that people are rewarded 
for eﬀort and skill (because they are) than in Sweden and other countries, 
where the narrower distribution of earnings and lower returns to skill in fact 
means that people are rewarded less for skill and eﬀort. The diﬀerences in 
attitudes also might be greatly inﬂ  uenced by social rhetoric—the U.S. story 
of the land of opportunity versus the Swedish story of egalitarianism.
1.2.1    Changes  in  Attitudes
Did Swedish views about inequality change in the 1990s, as inequal-
ity rose? To the extent that attitudes toward inequality respond to exist-
ing inequality, we would expect persons to become more tolerant toward 
inequality as it increases in society (“it is the way the world is”). On the 
other side, increases in inequality in a society where people are committed 
to more egalitarian outcomes might generate more negative attitudes toward 
increased inequality and a desire for government policies to reduce income 
diﬀerences more than in the past.
As a ﬁ  rst step to seeing how attitudes in fact change, we contrast the 
responses of Swedes to the 1999 ISSP survey to their responses to the same 
questions in Stefan Svallfors’s (1992) survey of Swedish attitudes toward 
inequality that, which became part of the 1992 ISSP Social Inequality II 
survey. Table 1.6 gives the results of this comparison.16 Focusing on the 
diﬀerence between the proportion that agrees or agrees strongly and the 
proportion that disagrees or disagrees strongly with the statements, the data 
15. As U.S. income inequality has risen, however, the Syracuse University Maxwell Poll 
(2007) has reported increased belief that income inequality is a serious problem and that 
government should do more to try to reduce it; available at: http:/  /  www.maxwell.syr.edu/ 
campbell/ programs/ maxwellpoll.htm.
16. This table reports statistics for those who gave explicit answers, eliminating “don’t know” 
responses. This causes a modest diﬀerence in the 1999 percentages from those in table 1.5. The 
way we treat “don’t know” answers does not aﬀect the ﬁ  ndings in either case.42        Anders Björklund and Richard B. Freeman
tell a clear story. Over the 1990s, proportionately more Swedes became con-
cerned with the adverse eﬀects of inequality than with the incentive eﬀects 
of inequality. The diﬀerence in the proportion who view income diﬀerences 
as too large rises from 40 points to 60 points, and the diﬀerence in the pro-
portions who believe inequality beneﬁ  ts the rich rises from 31 points to 44 
points, while the diﬀerence between those who think income diﬀerentials 
are needed for prosperity and those who do not falls from –  9 points to 
–  26 points. The proportions that agree and disagree that the rich should 
pay more taxes and the proportions that believe and do not believe that 
people study to earn money remain essentially constant, but the propor-
tion that believes government should reduce income diﬀerences increases. 
In short, the rise in inequality reduced the proportion of Swedes attuned to 
the eﬃciency aspects of inequality and increased the proportion who favored 
policies to reduce inequality on these questions.
The 1991 and 2000 LNU surveys asked a diﬀerent question on attitudes 
toward inequality: what people thought about “the idea of going in for a soci-
ety where income diﬀerentials are small.” On the basis of the ISSP results, we 
would expect that the proportion favoring a lower income diﬀerential society 









beneﬁ  ts rich
    1991   1999   1991   1999   1991   1999
Strongly agree 24 28 5 3 21 17
Agree 35 42 25 17 32 44
Neither 22 18 31 29 25 22
Disagree 14 8 30 31 17 14
Strongly disagree 5 2 9 15 5 3
Agree- Disagree 40   60   –9   –26   31   44






People study to 
earn money
1991   1999   1991   1999   1991   1999
Strongly agree 14 16 17 24 25 20
Agree 62 60 36 36 47 52
Neither 23 22 18 22 14 16
Disagree 1 1 19 13 12 11
Strongly disagree 0 0 10622
Agree- Disagree   75   75   24   31   48   49
Source: Tabulated from the ISSP (1992; 1999); the 1992 ISSP is based on Svallfors (1991).Searching for Optimal Inequality/Incentives    4 3
would rise, but the LNU data show a slight movement in the opposite direc-
tion. The fraction that thought that going for a small income diﬀerential 
society was very good fell modestly from 1991 to 2000, while the fraction 
who thought this was quite good and the fraction who thought it quite bad 
rose modestly.17 The diﬀerent pattern in the LNU than in the ISSP sug-
gests that the precise wording of questions may cause diﬀerent patterns of 
response across the surveys and thus makes us cautious about drawing any 
ﬁ  rm conclusions.
The ISSP surveys contain another set of questions that cast light on how 
attitudes toward inequality in Sweden have changed over time relative to 
attitudes in other countries during the 1990s rise of inequality. The ISSP 
asks respondents the pay they believe workers make in diﬀerent occupa-
tions: “What do you think people in these jobs actually earn?” Respondents 
are also asked what they believe people should make: “How much do you 
think people in these jobs ought to earn?” These questions were asked for 
nine occupations in 1987 and for eleven occupations in 1992 and 1999.18 
Responses about the earnings people actually earn provide one way of 
assessing whether perceptions of income diﬀerences reﬂ  ect actual diﬀerences 
among countries and over time.19
To analyze these data, we calculated for each individual the standard devia-
tion of the ln (natural logarithm) earnings that they said people earned 
across occupations and the standard deviation of the ln earnings they said 
people should earn across occupations. The standard deviation of the ln 
earnings summarizes their responses into a single statistic that measures 
dispersion. Figure 1.5 displays the country averages of the standard devia-
tions of the ln of actual earnings and of “should” earnings. Almost all of the 
data points fall below the 45 degree line. This indicates that regardless of the 
perceived level of dispersion of wages, respondents favor lower dispersion. 
A linear regression of the average standard deviation of the ln earnings that 
17. Here are the tabulations:
The idea of going in for a society where income diﬀerentials is small
      2000  1991  Change 
Very good 20 26 06
Quite good 32 29 03
Neither good nor bad 17 17 00
Quite bad 20 18 02
  Very bad   07   07   00  
18. The occupations are from the following list: bricklayer, doctor in general practice, bank 
clerk, shop owner, chairman of a large company, skilled worker in a factory, farm laborer, 
secretary, city bus driver, unskilled worker in a factory, and cabinet minister.
19. Asking respondents to report on earnings in speciﬁ  c occupations before asking them what 
they think people should make arguably grounds responses in reality more than do questions 
about inequality in general.44        Anders Björklund and Richard B. Freeman
respondents believe should be paid on the average standard deviation of the 
ln earnings they believe people are actually paid ﬁ  ts the data reasonably well, 
with a slope of 0.61. This positive slope implies that as the perceived actual 
dispersion is larger, the dispersion people believe is appropriate rises, but at 
lower than a one-  for-  one rate.20
The data points for Sweden (denoted with the large diamond) ﬁ  t the 
regression line. Persons in Sweden perceive (correctly) that the country has 
Fig. 1.5    Dispersion of ln earnings believed “should be paid” in diﬀerent occupations 
and the dispersion of ln perceived actual earnings, by country: 1987, 1992, and 1999
Source: Tabulated from the International Social Science Program (ISSP) surveys for 1987, 
1992, and 1999. Sweden data are from Svallfors (1992) and the 1999 ISSP survey.
Note: The regression line: 
SD(LnShld)  0.11  0.61 SD(LnActual)  YDs  0.15 ComD N  52, 
 (0.06)  (0.07)
where LnShld is the natural log of the earnings that respondents believe should be paid in an 
occupation, LnActual is the natural log of the earnings that respondents believe is paid in 
an occupation, YDs are two year dummies, and ComD is a dummy for countries that were 
Communist in 1987—East Germany, Hungary, and Poland. The standard deviations (SD) are 
averages of standard deviations reported by all respondents from the country.
20. Further analyses that treat individuals rather than country averages as observations 
yield similar results for the 1999 ISSP; they show no noticeable diﬀerence in the regression 
coeﬃcients of the standard deviation of the ln pay that respondents say people should receive 
in an occupation on the standard deviation of the ln earnings that respondents believe people 
actually receive between Sweden, the United States, and other countries as a group.Searching for Optimal Inequality/Incentives    4 5
a lower diﬀerence in earnings among occupations than persons in most 
other countries perceive in their countries. But low dispersion of perceived 
earnings notwithstanding, Swedes seem to want to narrow occupational 
pay diﬀerences even more. The 1999 observation for Sweden lies above the 
1991 observation. (Sweden was not part of the 1987 ISSP Social Inequal-
ity I survey.) The higher dispersion for perceived actual pay ﬁ  ts with the 
reality of rising inequality in earnings shown in ﬁ  gure 1.1. The higher dis-
persion in the earnings that respondents think should be paid in the vari-
ous occupations, however, is inconsistent with the responses about income 
inequality given in table 1.6, as it implies that as inequality rose, so too 
did tolerance of inequality. The way in which we measure the desire to 
reduce inequality evidently produces diﬀerent patterns of response across 
the surveys.21
1.2.2      Satisfaction with Personal Outcomes
An alternative way to assess how increased inequality has impacted Swed-
ish citizens is to relate their self-  reported satisfaction with their living con-
ditions, jobs, and wages or income before and after the economic recovery. 
People’s feelings toward their personal situation may diﬀer from attitudes 
toward what is happening in the economy as a whole. Ms. A might be doing 
personally well but may be troubled by inequality or unemployment in the 
country, while Mr. B might be having personal economic diﬃculties but may 
be satisﬁ  ed with economic conditions broadly.
Table 1.7 tabulates the responses to ﬁ  ve questions on the 1991 and 2000 
LNU surveys relating to the satisfaction of individuals with their own cir-
cumstances. The responses to questions about the individuals’ personal 
situations or changes in situation or life satisfaction do not vary much over 
time. Responses relating to job satisfaction and satisfaction with wages show 
declines in well-  being and increased dispersion in these forms of personal 
well-  being. There is a 10 percentage-  point drop in the proportion very sat-
isﬁ  ed with their job and a large shift in the distribution of responses on 
wage satisfaction from very/  rather satisﬁ  ed to very/  rather dissatisﬁ  ed. To 
see whether the reduction in job and wage satisfaction are related to objec-
tive factors, we regressed them on the log of hourly wages and reported 
working conditions in 1991 and 2000, conditional on family conditions, 
age, gender, and education. The results, summarized in table 1.8, show that 
wages are strongly related to wage satisfaction, while measures of working 
conditions are closely linked to job satisfaction. The large coeﬃcients on 
the log of hourly wages, combined with the rising standard deviation in the 
hourly wages, could help explain the increased dispersion in the responses 
21. In calculations for the 1999 ISSP, we have found that persons who are more concerned 
about the adverse eﬀects of inequality and less concerned about the incentive eﬀects in the ques-
tions report smaller dispersions of earnings that they think should be paid across occupations. 
Thus, there is no inconsistency in attitudes among persons within the survey. The problem is 
in the trend across surveys over time.46        Anders Björklund and Richard B. Freeman
to the question about satisfaction with wages. The changes in the fraction 
of persons reporting diﬀerent objective working conditions, however, are 
too small to explain much of the change in that variable on the basis of the 
estimated coeﬃcients. Exploiting the longitudinal component of the LNU, 
we also examined changes in wage satisfaction and job satisfaction between 
1991 and 2000 and obtained comparable results: a large coeﬃcient on ln 
wages in the wage satisfaction equation, which implies that increases in the 
standard deviation of ln wages contributed to the increased dispersion in 
wage satisfaction.22
Because unemployment is a major depressing factor on happiness, the 
surprise in table 1.7 is the stability in life satisfaction, despite higher and 
longer unemployment between the two surveys.23 We probe this ﬁ  nding fur-
Table 1.7  Satisfaction with living conditions, job, and wages: Nineteen-   to sixty- 
ﬁ   ve- year- olds
Satisfaction  
Overall life Job Wages
1991   1999   1991   1999   1991   1999
Very good/satisﬁ  ed 41 43 43 33 10 9
Rather good/satisﬁ  ed 53 51 45 50 45 38
Neither good/satisﬁ  ed nor bad/dissatisﬁ  ed 4 4 9 11 22 22
Rather bad/dissatisﬁ  e d 2225 1 7 2 1
Bad/very dissatisﬁ  e d 11127 1 0
Good/satisﬁ  ed-  Bad/dissatisﬁ  ed   91   91   85   76   31   16
Change in your situation  1991   1999 
Daily life source of 
personal satisfaction  1991   1999
Improved 52 56 Yes, most often 58 57
More/less same 35 31 Yes, sometimes 35 36
Deteriorated 13 13 No 7 7
Improved- Deteriorated   39   43   Yes- No   86   86
Source: Tabulated from the Level of Living (LNU) surveys based on the following questions: 
(a) “We have now been through a lot of questions about your living conditions in diﬀerent 
areas. How do you yourself view your own conditions? By and large, do you think that your 
situation is very good, rather good, rather bad, or very bad?” (b) “If you look back over the 
last ten years, do you think that your living conditions during this time have deteriorated, 
improved, or remained more or less the same?” (c) “Do you usually feel that your daily life is 
a source of personal satisfaction?” (d) “On the whole, how satisﬁ  ed are you with your present 
job?” and (e) “How satisﬁ  ed are you with your present wages (income from work)?” The ques-
tions were asked to those employed “last week”—that is, either employed or self-  employed 
during the week preceding the interview. The sample sizes ranged from 3,473 to 4,527, depend-
ing on the year and question.
22. The coeﬃcient in the wage satisfaction equation on change in log wages was 1.681 (0.125). 
Changes in job conditions had modest coeﬃcients on the work conditions variables.
23. The proportion of persons who were unemployed went from 7.0 percent in the 2000 
LNU to 3.7 percent in the 1991 LNU, and the duration of unemployment went from 0.46 of 
a year to 1.61 years.Table 1.8  Regression coeﬃcients (standard errors) for the eﬀect of working 
conditions, log wage, and demographic variables on job and wage 
satisfaction: Nineteen-   to sixty-  ﬁ  ve-  years of age
Sample mean 
(standard 
deviation) Job satisfaction Wage satisfaction
Variable   1991   2000   1991   2000   1991   2000
Job satisfaction 4.248 4.040
(0.804) (.873)
Wage satisfaction 3.317 3.092
(1.074) (1.160)
Log hourly wage 4.344 4.700 .110 .132 1.243 1.460
(.290) (.310) (.056) (.059) (.076) (.076)
Years of education 11.6 12.7 –.011 –.021 –.037 –.039
(3.14) (3.14) (.005) (.006) (.007) (.007)
Inﬂ  uence over job tasks .466 .490 .141 .240 .075 .026
(.028) (.031) (.038) (.041)
Learn new things at the job .485 .472 .281 .237 .016 .056
(.028) (.032) (.038) (.041)
Heavy lifting .169 .154 –.024 –.105 –.171 –.166
(.038) (.045) (.052) (.059)
Sweaty at job .227 .229 –.069 –.040 .028 –.160
(.034) (.040) (.047) (.052)
Mentally demanding .493 .518 –.163 –.247 –.171 –.366
(.027) (.031) (.038) (.040)
Monotonous job .182 .190 –.509 –.471 –.068 –.122
(.038) (.042) (.052) (.055)
Repetitive movements .411 .461 –.040 –.026 –.040 .050
(.030) (.033) (.041) (.042)
Age 39.8 41.2 .0031 .0008 –.0012 –.0121
(.0014) (.0016) (.0019) (.0020)
Male .500 .509 –.120 –.041 –.148 .086
(.029) (.033) (.040) (.043)
Married/cohabiting .719 .723 .061 .021 –.065 –.046
(.041) (.044) (.056) (.057)
Divorced .058 .058 .020 –.000 –.236 –.086
(.068) (.077) (.093) (.100)
Widowed .010 .015 .174 .132 –.059 .054
(.141) (.134) (.195) (.174)
Any kids .686 .690 –.025 –.023 –.167 –.102
(.038) (.041) (.052) (.053)
N 3,265 2,963 3,264 2,961 3,264 2,961
Adjusted R2           .1520   .1302   .0941   .1778
Source: Tabulated from Level of Living surveys.48        Anders Björklund and Richard B. Freeman
ther through multivariate regressions that link the level and duration of 
unemployment to how people assess their life situation/  living conditions 
and their life satisfaction in 1991 and 2000, conditional on a variety of 
covariates. Table 1.9 summarizes the regression ﬁ  ndings in terms of the 
coeﬃcients on unemployment measured as a 0/ 1 variable and the coeﬃcients 
on dummy variables for the duration of unemployment. Being unemployed 
has a sizeable adverse impact on both the persons’ assessment of their life 
situation/  living conditions and on their life satisfaction. There is no clear 
generalization to reach. Comparing the coeﬃcients on unemployment in 
regressions (1) and (2), we see that unemployment had a larger impact in re-
ducing the person’s assessment of their living conditions in 2000 than in 
1991. By contrast, in the life satisfaction regressions in columns (3) and (4), 
the impact of unemployment is lower in the 2000 survey than in the 1991 
survey, which implies that the impact of unemployment on life satisfaction 
lessened.
The increase in the duration of unemployment suggests that comparisons 
of the unemployed in the two periods may be confounded by changes in 
the group that is unemployed. Regressions (5) through (8) give regression 
coeﬃcients for the eﬀect of being in the speciﬁ  ed level of duration on the 
life situation/  living conditions and life satisfaction measures. The impact 
of the duration of unemployment variables on life situation varies across 
the groups. There is a large drop in eﬀect of unemployment on the person’s 
own conditions for every group but those with less than 0.3 year of unem-
ployment, with a particularly large drop for those with two years or more 
of unemployment. The impact of the duration of unemployment variables 
on life satisfaction are smaller in 2000 than in 1991, implying a substantial 
drop in unhappiness with unemployment at all durations. The data seem to 
suggest that people adjusted to unemployment between 1991 and 2000 so 
that with the higher rates, they were less impacted in their living conditions 
and in their life satisfaction, despite the longer durations of joblessness.
1.3      Inequality and Sweden’s Position in Competitiveness
Sweden’s recovery from the early 1990s recession was suﬃciently strong 
so that by 2007/  2008, it ranked number four in the World Economic Forum 
ranking of countries in global competitiveness. It was number two in the 
OECD ranking of countries by investment in knowledge.
Did the increased inequality help the recovery and improve the country’s 
high position in competitiveness?
1.3.1    Inequality  and  Recovery
There are three criteria for assessing whether an increase in inequality is 
likely to be incentive increasing and thus a potential contributor to economic 
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First, the increase should aﬀect observable incentives, such as returns 
to skill or wage diﬀerentials among ﬁ  rms or industries that signal workers 
to shift to the sectors with increased pay. If the increase shows up solely in 
higher returns to unmeasured factors (residuals), it is diﬃcult for anyone to 
know what to do. Examining changes in mean earnings across groups by 
education, occupation, or industry shows that at least some of the increased 
inequality in Sweden in the 1990s was associated with changes among per-
sons with observable characteristics. Studies of earnings patterns (Gustavs-
son 2006; Fredriksson and Topel, chapter 3 in this volume) ﬁ  nd that the 
payoﬀ to schooling increased over the 1990s, which created an incentive for 
Table 1.9  Regression coeﬃcients (standard errors) for estimates of the eﬀect of 
unemployment and duration of unemployment on life situation/living 
conditions and life satisfaction: Nineteen to sixty-  ﬁ  ve-  years of age
Measure of 
unemployment  





















Adjusted R2 .0579 .0604 .0408 .0321
Regressions with 
dummy variables 
for duration of 
unemployment
(5) (6) (7) (8)
 0.3 year .02298 .0264 –.099 –.232 –.150 –.099
(.066) (.065) (.062) (.062)
0.3–0.6 year .0067 .0117 –.439 –.266 –.224 –.076
(.122) (.091) (.114) (.087)
0.6–1.0 year .0022 .0064 –.620 –.416 –.243 –.004
(.206) (.124) (.193) (.119)
1.0–2.0 years .0038 .0079 –.297 –.159 –.385 –.141
(164) (.109) (.153) (.104)
 2 years .0013 .0174 –1.086 –.409 –.664 –.234
(.267) (.075) (.250) (.072)
Adjusted R2           .0615   .0608   .0411   .0321
Source: Each regression included dummy variables for whether the worker was full-  time or 
part-  time, self-  employed, a helper in the family, retired, a houseworker, or other, and for age, 
and sex. The life situation/living conditions outcome is based on the question, “We have now 
been through a lot of questions about your living conditions in diﬀerent areas. How do you 
yourself view your own conditions? By and large, do you think that your situation is very 
good, rather good, rather bad, or very bad?” The life satisfaction question is, “Do you usually 
feel that your daily life is a source of personal satisfaction?”50        Anders Björklund and Richard B. Freeman
additional school attendance that appears to underlie the observed increase 
in enrollment in higher education in the period (Fredriksson and Topel, 
chapter 3 in this volume).24 Examining data by plant, Nordström Skans, 
Edin, and Holmlund (2009) found that a trend rise in between-  plant wage 
inequality accounts for the entire increase in wage dispersion, which presum-
ably would motivate workers to move from the lower-  wage to the higher-
 wage  plants.
Second, the increase should induce economic behavior that reduces the 
inequality. For instance, a rise in inequality to education should produce an 
increased investment in skills, and an increase in inequality among sectors 
or ﬁ  rms should induce workers to move where pay has increased. Nord-
ström Skans, Edin, and Holmlund (2009) report modest positive correla-
tions between entry rates and wage changes and the standard deviation of 
wages within plants, which suggest that the increases in wages across and 
within plants may have induced workers to shift toward workplaces with 
rising earnings relative to others.
Third, the increase should be associated with improved national economic 
outcomes. Lindquist (2005) and Nahum (2005) suggest that the moderate 
increases in skill diﬀerentials and inequality have helped raise economic 
growth and eﬃciency in Sweden. Lindquist related the increased income 
inequality between high-   and low-  skilled workers in Sweden to changes in 
relative demand due to the presence of capital- skill complementarity in pro-
duction. Nahum ﬁ  nds that inequality within Swedish counties has a posi-
tive relation with the ensuing growth of the county’s economy. While these 
studies must make bold assumptions for their estimates, their diﬀerent data 
and methodologies suggest that at least some of the rise in inequality helped 
economic recovery.
On the other hand, it is diﬃcult to see how increased inequality in hours 
worked can create incentive. Some of this increase is associated with sickness 
absenteeism. While workers who are not employed or who work relatively 
few hours may be doing productive work in the household, it is diﬃcult 
to imagine that this compensates for the absence of market work. It also 
makes little sense for persons on sickness absence who are doing house-
hold work to be paid the beneﬁ  ts of someone who is truly incapacitated. 
Reductions of the inequality in hours worked would more likely enhance 
output.
1.3.2      Sweden in the Knowledge Economy
The doubling of the global labor force, due to China, India, and the ex- 
Soviet bloc joining the world economy, pressured advanced countries to 
invest heavily in higher education and research and development and in 
24. Our estimated earnings equations from the 1991 and 2000 LNU surveys also found that 
the earnings of university graduates increased relative to that of less- educated workers. We also 
found that the relative earnings of experienced workers fell, which increased equality, but it is 
unclear if this is a reduction in skill prices or in institutionally determined seniority.Searching for Optimal Inequality/Incentives    5 1
high-  tech industries. A priori, some analysts might expect that Sweden’s 
low inequality and modest gross wage premium to tertiary education would 
provide insuﬃcient incentive for investments in schooling, so the country 
would lag behind in the supply of highly educated persons compared to 
economies with higher premium, and this would keep the country from the 
front ranks of the research and development (R and D) and technology 
frontier. To be sure, the relatively low cost of highly skilled Swedish workers 
would increase ﬁ  rms’ demand for these workers, but the ﬁ  rms would face a 
supply constraint and would fall behind countries such as the United States, 
where the premium to university training is much higher. Nothing could be 
further from the truth.
Panel A of table 1.10 shows that Sweden is in the top rank of countries in 
investment in knowledge. It is number one in the world in R and D spending 
over GDP, number one in software investment over GDP, and number seven 
in higher education spending over GDP. Summing the three measures, the 
OECD’s investment in knowledge indicator places Sweden in the second 
spot, only behind the United States.
The data on educational attainment in panel B suggest that the OECD 
measure of higher education spending understates Sweden’s success in uni-
versity education, particularly in science and engineering (S and E). Sweden 
is fourth in the world (after Japan, Korea, and Canada) in degrees granted 
per twenty-  ﬁ  ve-   to thirty-  four-  year-  olds. Sweden is second among OECD 
countries (behind Korea) in the share of degrees awarded in science and 
engineering. Its S and E share of degrees is more than twice the U.S. share. 
At the doctorate level, Sweden is number one in PhDs and in science and 
engineering PhDs granted per young person. If the United States had the 
Swedish rate of S and E PhDs per young person, it would be producing over 
100,000 doctoral graduates in those disciplines.
What motivates so many young Swedes to invest in higher education? 
Even after the 1990s to mid-  2000s increase in earnings inequality, pay 
diﬀerences between highly educated workers and less-  educated workers 
were lower in Sweden than in the United States and most other countries, 
at both the tertiary and advanced research program levels. The increased 
earnings diﬀerential between university graduates and high school gradu-
ates in the 1990s and the high unemployment during and after the recession 
contributed to the growth of university enrollments in Sweden (Fredriksson 
and Topel, chapter 3 in this volume) but cannot account for the concentra-
tion on science and engineering or the extraordinary proportion of persons 
obtaining PhDs in science and engineering.
One factor that helps compensate for the lower labor market diﬀerentials 
is the low cost of attending universities. Students are eligible for grants and 
loans, with repayments that are income contingent, to help them through 
the student years. Indeed, for graduate studies, the norm is that the students 
are eligible to a wage at the level-  of-  living wage. But OECD estimates of 
internal rates of return to tertiary education (Boarini and Strauss 2007, 52        Anders Björklund and Richard B. Freeman
ﬁ  gure 11) show that while this improves Sweden’s ranking in returns and 
lowers the return to the United States, it still leaves Sweden in the bottom 
third of countries by rate of return. There are no readily available estimates 
of the return to graduate training across countries to see how Sweden ﬁ  ts 
on that margin.
Table 1.10  Sweden compared to the United States, the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development Countries, and the European Union in 
knowledge economy: 2004
A. OECD investment in knowledge
   
R and D/GDP 
(rank of 18)  
Software 
(rank of 18)  
Higher education 




Sweden 3.98 (1) 1.54 (1) 0.93 (7) 6.44 (2)
United States 2.74 (4) 1.46 (2) 2.36 (1) 6.56 (1)
OECD 2.41 1.08 1.42 5.10
EU   2.02   0.80   0.79   3.62
B. Young persons in higher education
   
Bachelor’s/
25–34 years old 
(rank of 30)  
S and E share 
of Bachelor’s 
(rank of 30)  
PhDs/age 
(rank of 34)  
S and E PhDs/
age (rank of 31)
Sweden 42.3 (4) 31.7 (2) 3.1 (1) 1.6 (1)
United States 39.1 (7) 14.7 1.3 (11) 0.3 (22)
OECD 31.0 21.2 1.3 0.5
EU19   —   23.4   1.4   0.6
C. Scientiﬁ  c output
   
Scientiﬁ  c articles 
per capita 
(rank of 38)  
Relative prominence 
of cited articles 
(rank of 39)  
Patents/millions 
(rank of 32)
Sweden 1,143 (2) 0.86 (5) 72.3 (5)
United States 726 (31) 1.03 (2) 55.1 (8)
OECD 441 — 43.9
EU19   573   0.74   32.4a
Source: Panel A: OECD (2007b), ﬁ  gure A1.1, “Investment in knowledge as percent of GDP 
2004.” Panel B: OECD (2007a, 180), “Tertiary attainment for age group 25–34”; ﬁ  gure B1.2, 
“S&E degrees as a percentage of total new degrees”; and ﬁ  gure B1.1, “Graduate rates at the 
doctorate level.” Panel C: OECD (2007b), ﬁ  gure D.5.1, “Scientiﬁ  c articles per million popu-
lation 2003”; ﬁ  gure D1.4, “Triadic patent families per million population”; and ﬁ  gure D5.2, 
“Relative importance of scientiﬁ  c literature.”
Note: “R and D”  research and development; “S and E”  science and engineering. Figure 
A2.1, “R&D intensity,” compares R and D over GDP in thirty-  three countries; Sweden ranks 
number one, while the United States ranks number seven. In this compilation, the Swedish R 
and D/GDP ratio is nearly twice that for the European Union and 70 percent higher than the 
OECD average.
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Panel C in table 1.10 records measures of the output of Sweden’s invest-
ment in scientiﬁ  c and engineering activity and research and development. In 
terms of research output, Sweden ranks second (after Switzerland) in terms 
of scientiﬁ  c articles published per capita. Citation indices per article place 
Sweden fourth in the world in the prominence of its published research. 
Finally, Sweden has a high number of patents measured per million in-
habitants. When the share of Swedish companies with innovative activity 
is compared internationally, Swedish companies are above the average of 
EU countries.
Much of Sweden’s investment in R and D is due to activities of the Swed-
ish multinational ﬁ  rms, such as Ericsson, which conduct much of their 
research and development in the country, while locating the bulk of produc-
tion outside the country. This would appear to be an economic response to 
the country’s large supply of undergraduate and graduate degree recipients, 
particularly in science and engineering, and their relatively low cost, but it 
still leaves open the question of how the country has overcome the low pecu-
niary returns in order to induce so many young persons to obtain advanced 
research and other degrees.
Finally, it is Sweden’s exemplary position in these and other measures 
of technological prowess, innovation, higher education and training, and 
business sophistication that underlie its position as the fourth-  top country 
in the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report (2008). By 
contrast, the competitiveness report gives Sweden lower marks for its high 
taxes and such labor market factors as ﬂ  exibility of wage determination 
and hiring and ﬁ  ring practices. To some extent, however, these desirable 
and less-  desirable aspects of the welfare state are intertwined: high taxes 
fund investments in higher education and research and development, which 
buttress innovativeness.
1.4    Conclusion
This chapter has examined the pattern of change and correlates of Swe-
den’s national eﬀort to produce egalitarian labor market outcomes and the 
interplay between the level and change in inequality and attitudes toward 
inequality. It has found the following:
1.  Earnings and income inequality increased after the early 1990s reces-
sion, with smaller increases in income for persons at the bottom of the 
income distribution than for those higher in the distribution. Government 
safety net programs buttressed disposable income for those with low incomes 
during the 1990s recession.
2.  Despite the increase in inequality, Sweden remained one of the most 
egalitarian economies in the world. The rise in inequality raised earn-
ings for identiﬁ  able groups and seems to have contributed to economic 
recovery.54        Anders Björklund and Richard B. Freeman
3. The low level of inequality and labor market returns to skill not-
withstanding, Sweden moved to the top of the league tables in knowledge-
  intensive activities. Five times as many Swedes obtained PhDs in science 
and engineering as Americans relative to the population, and Sweden was 
the world leader in R and D over GDP. These achievements highlight the 
ability of Sweden to overcome some of the incentive problems of a welfare 
state.
4.  With respect to attitudes, Swedes are more attuned to the inequity face 
of inequality than to the incentive face of inequality than are Americans. 
But Swedish attitudes are closer to those of persons in most other countries. 
It is the American attitudes that are divergent.
5.  Proportionately more Swedes expressed concern over the inequity of 
inequality after the rise in inequality in the 1990s than in the past, but there 
are suﬃcient diﬀerences in changes among measures of attitudes to rule out 
any ﬁ  rm conclusions about how the recession and recovery aﬀected how 
people feel toward inequality.
6.  Swedes expressed greater dissatisfaction with wages and conditions at 
work during the 1990s, but the rise in unemployment did not reduce overall 
subjective well- being, seemingly because individuals adapted to higher levels 
of unemployment.
Perhaps the most intriguing question that emerges from our analysis is 
how Sweden managed to reach the top of world tables in the proportion 
of young persons gaining PhDs and bachelor’s degrees and in competitive-
ness, with only a moderate increase in earnings inequality and low return to 
tertiary education. Could it be that limited pecuniary incentives motivate 
Swedes to distinguish themselves in other productive ways? Or, could it be 
that in a highly egalitarian society, seemingly small changes in inequality 
can motivate people more than they might in an economy with a wider dis-
persion of overall earnings? Whichever the reason, Sweden did well in the 
inequality front in its recovery from the early 1990s economic disaster.
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